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Can God Know What Time it is? A Working 
Paper 
Caleb Brown 
     In Four Views: God and Time, three of the four contributors argue God’s 
atemporality is inconsistent with the dynamic view of time. If God is atemporal, 
time is not dynamic, and if time is dynamic, God is not atemporal. The fourth 
contributor, Nicholas Wolterstorff, holds that these two positions are not inherently 
inconsistent but are inconsistent with the typical view of God’s knowledge and 
action in the world.1 In this paper, I use the survey of views presented in Four 
Views: God and Time as the jumping-off point for an argument that the following 
propositions consistent: 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
2. God is atemporal 
3. God knows tensed facts 
4. Free human actions are possible 
5. God interacts responsively with humans 
I do not try to demonstrate that these propositions are true, but rather that accepting 
all of them together is logically possible. I first consider each proposition 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Response to Alan G. Padgett," in God and Time, ed. Gregory 
Ganssle (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 120-121. 
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individually, explaining its meaning and why it is significant to the discussion of 
God and time. Then I demonstrate consistency, starting with the first two 
propositions and gradually incorporating the others. Throughout this paper I 
assume a Judeo-Christian conception of God. 
The Five Propositions are Significant 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
     While there is certainly an element of psychological reality in our experience of 
time (for instance, when time seems to slow down) the dynamic theory of time 
states that the notion of “present” has objective reference. Under the static theory 
of time (McTaggart’s “B-theory”), it is just as objectively correct to say that seven 
days ago is present, as it is to say that the moment I am currently experiencing is 
present, as it is to say seven days in the future is present. These times are 
distinguished solely by their earlier and later than relationships, not by their 
relationship to an objective present.2 Contrasting the dynamic and static 
conceptions, Gregory Ganssle writes, “What is the Now? The A-theorist says that 
the Now exists in a way that the past and future do not. The Now is a privileged 
temporal location. The B-theorist holds that the Now is dependent on the 
psychological states of knowing minds.”3  
                                                 
2 E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 310. 
3 Gregory Ganssle, in the introduction to God and Time, ed. Gregory Ganssle (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 14. 
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     If the A-theory of time is abandoned in favor of the B-theory, the notion of 
salvation history is vitiated.4 If time does not progress, if it is static and there is no 
objective present, then God sees it as such. Thus, from His perspective, and it seems 
His perspective is the most important, God achieves no final victory over evil. As 
Christ returns in glory to judge the living and the dead, it is equally true from God’s 
perspective that He is hanging on the cross condemned for sinners. The notion of 
God’s redemptive plan for humanity, a clear element of the biblical narrative, has 
little meaning if the A-theory of time is not true. If evil is to be conquered, God, the 
author of reality, must see that evil has been conquered. Thus, the A-theory is 
significant to our discussion.      
2. God is atemporal 
     The historically dominant position on God and time is that God is atemporal—
he has no temporal location or extension.5 Boethius writes: “It is the common 
judgement, then, of all creatures that live by reason that God is eternal . . .. Eternity, 
                                                 
4 William Craig, “Response to Paul Helm,” in God and Time, ed. Gregory Ganssle 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 66-67. 
5 Dr. Martin of Liberty University described atemporality in these terms in PHIL 430 in 
the spring of 2017. God’s lack of temporal location means He is not specially related to any 
temporal point. God’s lack of temporal extension means He not involved in the transition from 
one moment to the subsequent moment. 
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then, is the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life; this 
will be clear from a comparison with creatures that exist in time.”6  
     Divine atemporality is the historic position of Christian thinkers because having 
life “all at once” is viewed as a perfection. Even some who deny God’s atemporality 
recognize the strength of this argument. Craig writes: “One of the most important 
arguments in favor of divine timelessness rests on the claim that the fleeting nature 
of temporal life is incompatible with the life of a most perfect being such as God 
is.”7 A God who is caught up in the current of time and is unable to transcend it is 
limited. Taking a minority position, Nicholas Wolterstorff thinks there is something 
inherently better about being able to experience progression, as opposed to the all-
encompassing presentness of atemporality.8 He thus rejects the view that 
atemporality is a perfection, but his argument only holds if God’s atemporality 
means He cannot know tensed facts and so cannot track the development of 
salvation history. God’s knowledge of tensed facts is addressed by the third 
proposition. 
  
                                                 
6 Qtd. in Paul Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” in God and Time, ed. Gregory Ganssle 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 34. 
7 William Craig, “Timelessness & Omnitemporality” in God and Time, ed. Gregory 
Ganssle (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 132. 
8 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Response to Paul Helm,” in God and Time, ed. Gregory 
Ganssle (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 73. 
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     3. God knows tensed facts 
 
     This proposition answers “yes” to the question, does God know what time it is? 
Thus, God can distinguish between past, present, and future, and knows whether 
tensed propositions like “Today it is raining,” and time-stamped propositions like 
“It is raining in Lynchburg, Virginia at 4:39 on March 28th, 2017” are true. As Craig 
points out, this is important because, “A person who has maximum cognitive 
excellence as God does cannot plausibly be ignorant of what is presently going on 
in the universe. Thus, if time is dynamic, God must know tensed facts, however 
these are construed.”9 
     4. Free human choices are possible 
     In God, Evil, and Free Will, Alvin Plantinga describes free choices: “If a person 
is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free 
to refrain from performing it.”10 While less strict conceptions of freedom may be 
viable, in this paper I assume that, to be free, a choice must not be sufficiently 
caused apart from the volition of the agent (the agent’s appropriate volition is a 
necessary condition of the choice being made), and that volition itself must not be 
causally determined by anything external to the agent. Free human choice is 
                                                 
9 Craig, “Response to Paul Helm,” 65. 
10 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
1977), 29. While I am not convinced that Eleonore Stump’s criterion for free actions, that their 
ultimate cause does not lie outside the agent, is unfounded, I think that the stronger form Plantinga 
gives here can still be proven consistent with the other propositions, and this conclusion is more 
fruitful. 
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essential to moral responsibility. Because the Bible teaches moral responsibility, 
maintaining moral responsibility and free choice is significant for our view of God 
and time.  
     5. God interacts responsively with humans 
     If humans make free choices, and some of those choices are necessary 
conditions for choices God makes, then God interacts responsively with humans. I 
do not mean that, to be responsive, God must decide to respond temporally after 
the request is given. Maintaining God’s responsiveness is significant because His 
responsiveness cannot be sacrificed without theological vitiation. The concept of 
God redeeming humanity, for instance, is inherently responsive.  
The Five Propositions are Consistent 
     In this section I demonstrate that the five significant propositions considered 
above are not inconsistent. Consider the first two propositions together: 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
2. God is atemporal 
Most of the authors in Four Views: God and Time write that these two propositions 
are inconsistent.11 As Paul Helm, an atemporalist, states: “If God had created the 
temporal order as an A-series [dynamic] from his standpoint, then God would 
himself be in time. So, it makes better sense for the eternalist to suppose that God 
                                                 
11 William Craig, “Response to the Critics,” in God and Time, ed. Gregory Ganssle 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 179; Alan Padgett, “Eternity as Relative Timelessness,” 
in God and Time, ed. Gregory Ganssle (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 95. 
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created the temporal order as a B-series.”12 However, as Nicholas Wolterstorff 
points out, the logical inconsistency between these two propositions is not evident 
as they are stated above.13 The inconsistency arises because these two propositions 
seem to entail inconsistent positions on topics such as God’s knowledge of tensed 
facts, human free will, and God’s responsiveness. So, the first discussion of 
consistency will evaluate the first three propositions together: 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
2. God is atemporal 
3. God knows tensed facts 
     If God does not experience temporal succession, then how does He know what 
time it is? How does God know it is true if I say I am typing, and know it is no 
longer true that I am eating breakfast? Under a traditional conception of God’s 
omniscience, He knows all events that will happen, past, present, and future. 
Humans, denied this knowledge, and caught up on the crest of the flow of time, can 
experientially differentiate between the past, present, and future—they know the 
present because it is all they can know directly—but God, if atemporal, is not so 
limited, and this (so the argument goes) impedes His ability to discern the present. 
  
                                                 
12 Helm, 58. 
13 Wolterstorff, “Response to Alan G. Padgett,” 120-121. 
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Analysis of what A-theory Knowledge of Tensed Facts Entails 
     Consider the A-theory of time: the future is not, while the present, and perhaps 
the past, are.14 From whence does the next moment into the future emerge? Is it ex 
nihilo?  What brings it forth? Under A-theory, it seems reasonable to assume God 
imbues His creation with the ability to project the present to create the future. The 
universe has a temporal inertia which brings being out of non-being.  
     This creation of the future from the present is analogous to the expansion of the 
universe. The universe is expanding, but from what? Into what? By what causality? 
By the causality of what is. The universe has a spatial inertia which creates space 
out of nothing. God transcends the universe; He is not specially related to any point 
in space and does not experience spatial extension, but it is not problematic to say 
that He knows what is. Even so, it is legitimate to posit that an atemporal God can 
discern the difference between what is, rather than what is not, and knows the 
present as the ever-advancing edge of what is. 
     It can be objected that, because the universe is continuously changing in size, 
God only knows what spatially is if He knows what time it is. The above analogy 
assumes God’s knowledge of tensed facts, so it cannot be used as analogous 
evidence for God’s knowledge of tensed facts.15 This objection misses the point. 
                                                 
14 Lowe, 328. 
15 My thanks to Julia Dandurand, instructor at California State University Northridge, and 
Zane Richer for pointing out this potential objection. 
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The relevant question regarding the expansion of the universe is whether, if granted 
temporal knowledge, God knows what is spatially actual and what is not.16 It is 
clear He can. His knowledge of what will be does not obscure His understanding of 
what is. Saying God has knowledge of tensed facts does not go substantially beyond 
the uncontroversial idea that God knows how big the universe is at a given point in 
time. Both cases of knowledge are simply cases of God knowing what is as 
distinguished from what is not.  
God Can Know What Time it is Without Possessing Temporal Location 
     Consider the following analogy: Temporal reality as God views it is a dry river 
bed with debris scattered on it. God enjoys no special relationship with any point 
in the river bed—conceive of Him as at an indeterminate point above the river bed. 
The debris represent moments. Importantly, God does not have any special 
relationship with any of these moments. Now conceive of a flood coursing down 
the river bed. The crest of the flood is the present. It is ever advancing. As it floats 
a piece of debris, that moment becomes. God knows what the present will be before 
it is (debris are in the same relationship to Him whether floating or not), but this 
does not stop Him from knowing what is (actually present). God can track the 
progression of existence, and thus knows tensed facts, without being specially 
related to any point in time. 
                                                 
16 The presence of time in the question of the expansion of the universe is legitimate 
because the question of spatial change cannot be evaluated apart from time; time is a necessary 
condition of spatial change. 
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     This analysis may seem to imply a progression in what God knows exists 
(temporally), and progression is only coherent if God is temporal. If God knows 
moment m1 is, and then knows moment m2 is, and then m3, and so on, there seems 
to be progression in His mental state.  
God Can Have Real Knowledge of Progression Without Possessing Temporal 
Extension 
     In fact, the analysis above implies no such progression. Consider God’s 
knowledge: God knows not only each moment and its existence, He also knows His 
knowledge. He does not come to know that He knows moment m1 is, and then that 
He knows moment m2 is, and then that He knows m3 is. Rather, each knowing is 
directly known by Him via second-order knowledge. Even as He has knowledge of 
His knowledge of m1 as existing, He has knowledge of His knowledge of m2 as 
existing, and so on and vice-versa. So, there is no overall change in His mental 
state. Importantly, this (second order) knowledge, to be knowledge worthy of God, 
must include all information about His first-order knowings, including which 
knowings are of what in actuality is (present), and which are of what is not (future 
and past). This seems to reintroduce progression in God’s mental state, but only if 
He comes to know these facts about His knowings. So, there must be direct third-
order knowledge of the second-order knowings. Now an infinite regress is apparent. 
While normally problematic, an infinite regress is not problematic for an infinite 
mind. In fact, if we deny God knowledge of this type of sequence, we must deny 
Brown 11 
 
God the fullest knowledge of Himself.17 Lacking fullest knowledge of Himself 
would be an imperfection, so we can be confident that God can have knowledge of 
the sequence I have outlined above.  
     We have found: 1) The question of God’s knowledge of tensed facts boils down 
to a question of God’s knowledge of what is.  2) God can track what temporally is 
without being specially related to any point in time (no temporal location). 3) God 
can track change without this involving change in His mental state (no temporal 
extension). Thus, time can be dynamic, God can be atemporal, and yet God can still 
know tensed facts.  
     Now let us add the fourth proposition: 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
2. God is atemporal 
3. God knows tensed facts 
4. Free human actions are possible 
An Atemporal God’s Knowledge Still Poses a Threat to Human Freedom 
     While it has often been argued that God’s atemporality allows for divine 
“foreknowledge” and human freedom to be compatible, this has been contested, 
and for good reason. A properly phrased proposition can convey time-stamped truth 
atemporally. A proposition of the form X chooses Y at time T is true or false 
                                                 
17 For instance, a human can: know that 2 + 2 = 4, know that he knows 2 + 2 = 4, know 
that he knows that he knows 2 + 2 = 4. Although a finite human mind cannot traverse it, this 
sequence goes so on to infinity. To perfectly know Himself, God must know all there is to know 
about His knowledge, and so He must know this infinite sequence.  
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atemporally.18 If God can know propositions of this type, and if His knowledge 
cannot be mistaken, then His atemporal knowledge has the potential to constrain 
temporal free choices.19 So work must still be done to demonstrate (4) is consistent 
with the other propositions.  
A Model for Neutralizing the Omniscience Threat to Free Will 
     Consider the movie Back to the Future: when Marty McFly returns to the near-
present (about 10 minutes before he left) he knows that the Libyan terrorists will 
attempt to shoot Dr. Brown, but his foreknowledge does not impinge their free 
choice. Marty’s foreknowledge is simply that the Libyans will freely do what they 
freely do, a tautology with no power to restrict their free will. The objection will 
be, but if the outcome of the free choice is known before-hand, then it cannot be 
otherwise, so it is not free. But, to overcome this objection, we must note not only 
that it cannot be otherwise, but why it cannot be otherwise. It is clear in the case of 
the Libyan terrorists that it is not logically possible for them to do otherwise, but 
this is because of their own free choice and has nothing to do with Marty’s 
knowledge.20 The situation we are left with is that their own free choice determines 
                                                 
18 Dr. Martin of Liberty University laid this concept out in several classes I attended. 
 
19 I do not have the time to address the idea that future tense propositions about the 
outcome of free will events do not have truth values. But if I am successful in demonstrating 4. is 
consistent with the other propositions, much of the motivation for Open Theism will evaporate. 
 
20 It is never logically possible for anything to be otherwise than it is. The Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities must not be interpreted in a manner which defies the Laws of Non-
Contradiction and Excluded Middle. 
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what they do, which is nothing but to say that what they do, they do freely. This 
discussion shows that, if a free choice X of agent A is logically and causally prior 
to foreknowledge of X, then this foreknowledge does not infringe upon the freedom 
of A with respect to X. 
Free Will and Possible Worlds 
     Since God knows all that is, nothing can be other than what He knows it to be. 
A problem arises with God’s foreknowledge (as opposed to accurate human 
foreknowledge) because God sovereignly authors reality. Initially, this makes it 
look like nothing can be causally prior to His atemporal foreknowledge. The 
traditional view is that the world is a product of God’s mental conception, rather 
than the other way around. While the problem of free will and God’s knowledge 
has led people to deny God’s knowledge of the outcome of future free will events, 
I seek to uphold the traditional view of omniscience. The question is, Is there a way 
for God’s knowledge of the outcome of future free will events to meet the criteria 
outlined above (logically posterior, and causally dependent on free action), even 
though God sovereignly authors reality? I believe there is. 
     Free will decisions, both in their existence and in their outcome, define possible 
worlds because they exclude their complimentary worlds. A world where choice X 
by agent A is free is a different possible world than one where choice X by agent 
A is not free. Moreover, a world where choice X by agent A is free and results in 
outcome Y is a different possible world than one where choice X by agent A is free 
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and results in outcome Z (by outcome I mean what the agent, in a free-will event, 
chooses). It follows that every free choice made in the actual world defines the 
actual world in two ways: 1) that the choice is free, and 2) what is chosen.21 
     Under the traditional conception of divine omniscience, God knows all details 
of all possible worlds. Because free choices define possible worlds, they are known 
by God. Thus, God, when surveying all possible worlds, sees which choices are 
free and the outcomes of those choices.22 God then chooses which possible world 
to actualize.23  
     Note that the two criteria for the type of God’s knowledge which allows for free 
will are satisfied: logically, God knows the outcomes of free will events because 
agents freely choose, and God’s knowledge is caused by their choice. However, per 
the conception I have just laid out, absolutely nothing occurs apart from God’s will. 
God chooses the choices people make. But this does not infringe upon the freedom 
                                                 
21 While I have not found these concepts explicitly articulated anywhere, Plantinga’s 
discussion on pages 40-44 of God, Evil, and Free Will, seem to assume what I argue for here. I 
owe thanks to Dr. Beck of Liberty University for his feedback on these concepts.  
22 Plantinga, 34-44. Plantinga articulates important restrictions on what constitutes a 
possible world God could have actualized. I do not think that his analysis in any way invalidates 
my analysis. Further, I am using anthropomorphic terms. The fact that God knows all possible 
worlds and chooses one of them need not involve any process, deliberation, or indecision.  
I am not arguing that all human choices are free. Rather, I am only arguing that God’s 
foreknowledge need not eliminate free choice. Nothing I have said argues against mechanistic 
causal determinism.  
23 This does not render God’s knowledge dependent on human choice because, while it is 
proximately caused by human choice, it is ultimately caused by His actualization of the world. His 
knowledge is not caused by anything other than Himself. His aseity is unimpaired.  
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of the choice, for the freedom of the choice defines the possible world. God does 
not cause the choice; He merely actualizes it. God’s willing is not a sufficient cause 
of a choice, but is a necessary condition. This is the true meaning of the saying 
“nothing happens apart from the will of God.” Thus, God’s omniscience, 
sovereignty, and free human choice can all be maintained. 
This Approach is Neither Molinist nor Renders God Unjust and Allows for 
Prophecy 
     This portrayal is distinct from Molinism. Under Molinism, God is pictured as 
manipulating circumstances to ensure a given outcome. He orchestrates 
circumstances to deliver a sufficient cause of a given outcome of a choice and so 
guarantee His desired outcome. His relevant knowledge regarding free human 
choice is of what a person would choose. Under my conception, God’s knowledge 
is of simply what a person does choose, circumstances being whatever they may 
be. He does not orchestrate circumstances; He actualizes the world defined by a 
person’s free choice. Molinism does not satisfy the Principle of Alternate 
Possibility, but my conception does—while Molinism places causally deterministic 
constraints on choice, my conception constrains choice only by the laws of the 
Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction—the only restriction is that a proposition 
articulating the outcome of a free will event must be either true or false, not both or 
something in the middle. But these laws do not constrain the truth value of such 
propositions; only a free choice determines their truth value. 
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     Another possible objection is that God is unjust in holding humans accountable 
for their choices if He chooses those choices. This is misguided. Humans are justly 
accountable for the choices which they make freely, and, if you accept the argument 
above, we have already established that freedom of choice can be maintained. 
Moreover, the idea that Charley, in another possible world, would have done 
differently is irrelevant. In the actual world, Charley, as agent, chooses freely, and 
he would have done differently if he had chosen to do so. The Charley who freely 
chooses rightly or wrongly and is morally accountable for his choice is the only 
actual Charley, and so the only Charley God must act justly towards. Charley in 
counterfactual situations is not actual, and thus cannot be wronged. God is not 
accountable to not-things.24  
     Finally, note that this conception of God’s foreknowledge and free human action 
is compatible with foreknowledge within time (although I maintain God’s 
atemporality). Recall that our starting illustration was of Marty McFly’s 
foreknowledge within time. Thus, God’s revelation to humans (prophecy), which 
results in foreknowledge within time, need not conflict with human free will.  
     Now we add in the fifth proposition: 
1. The dynamic theory of time (McTaggart’s “A-theory”) is correct 
2. God is atemporal 
3. God knows tensed facts 
4. Free human actions are possible 
                                                 
24 The question of God’s goodness and why He chooses to actualize this world is a 
separate question and, while worthwhile, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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5. God interacts responsively with humans 
     Nicholas Wolterstorff writes: “Traditional theologians had a number of reasons 
for holding that there is nothing in God that is a response, chief among them their 
conviction that responsiveness on God’s part would compromise God’s aseity, 
God’s unconditionedness . . .. Responsiveness would require tensed knowledge on 
God’s part.”25 
     The discussion above allows for God’s responsiveness without compromising 
His primacy. If God has knowledge of tensed facts, He can know when a request is 
made and, because of this knowledge, act at a particular time in a way which He 
would not otherwise have acted. Thus, the criterion for responsive interactions 
given at the beginning of this paper is satisfied. Moreover, because God chooses 
which world to actualize, and knows the requests that will be freely made, He can 
respond to these requests from eternity, with no change entailed. Finally, any notion 
of God being a puppet who must respond to our requests is eliminated because these 
very requests are chosen by Him, even as they are made freely by us. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” in God and Time, ed. 
Gregory Ganssle (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 206. 
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